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Computer aided interactive narrative allows people to participate actively in a dynamically unfolding story, by playing a character
or by exerting directorial control. Because of its potential for providing interesting stories as well as allowing user interaction,
interactive narrative has been recognized as a promising tool for providing both education and entertainment.This paper discusses
the challenges in creating interactive narratives for pedagogical applications and how the challenges can be addressed by using
agent-based technologies. We argue that a rich model of characters and in particular a Theory of Mind capacity are needed. The
character architect in theThespian framework for interactive narrative is presented as an example of how decision-theoretic agents
can be used for encodingTheory of Mind and for creating pedagogical interactive narratives.
1. Introduction
Story has been a central part of the human experience, both as
entertainment and as a powerful tool for providing pedagogy.
Wewatchmovies, read novels, and tell stories as a regular part
of our lives. With the rapid development of computer tech-
nologies, a new form of media—computer aided interactive
narrative—has received increasing attention in recent years.
Interactive narrative allows a user to play a role in a story
and interact with digital characters driven by a computer
system. Unlike reading a novel or watching amovie, the users
can actively participate in interactive narratives. They can
explore the storyworld and see the effect of their actions, both
physically and socially, in the immediate and longer terms. If
the user is unsatisfied with how the story ends, he or she can
start over and try alternative options.
When applied to training cultural and social skills, inter-
active narrative provides a unique platform that combines
the pedagogical power of narrative with an active learning
experience. The ability of narrative to captivate the audience
and the direct link between actions and outcomes ideally
engage users, motivate them to spend more time learning
(e.g., to explore alternative paths in the story), and appro-
priately contextualize the experience. Moreover, interactivity
and the user’s experience of agency can promote intrinsic
motivation in learning [1] and support learning in context and
replay [2–7].
Interactive narrative has been recognized as a promising
teaching tool in a wide variety of social interaction scenarios,
such as HIV prevention [8], PTSD intervention [9], language
and cultural skills training [10], antibullying interventions for
young children [11], negotiation and communication skills
training [12, 13], and social learning (see [14] for a review).
Outside of social interaction training, interactive narrative-
based games have also been used for science education
[15, 16], military decision-making training [17], and health
education for children such as Lungtropolis (2012) where
children learn about asthma.
The enthusiasm for interactive narratives goes beyond
its use in training. In recent years, games for entertainment
that emphasize the social and narrative aspects of the player’s
experience have become increasingly popular. This is evi-
denced in recentmajor titles such asHeavy Rain,Mass Effect,
and Bioshock. Game designers have been looking into ways
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to use rich characters and narratives to engage the player and
to provide the central experience of the game. For example,
Wang et al. argue that “in order to be a highly enjoyable game
that is often deliberately selected and played over a longer
period—a game must utilize both narrativity and social
interaction to promote a player’s emotional engagement and
elevate the level of pleasure in game play” [18]. In fact, the
rapid growth of interest in interactive narrative is in part
motivated by the explosion of video games in recent years.
In this paper, we discuss key challenges in creating nar-
rative-based pedagogical systems. We argue that a rich char-
acter model and, in particular, a Theory of Mind capacity are
needed for addressing these challenges. TheThespian frame-
work for authoring and simulating interactive narratives is
discussed as an example of a computational system capable
of modeling rich characters with a Theory of Mind. We
discuss examples of using the Thespian framework to author
pedagogical interactive narratives followed by a discussion of
future work.
2. Design Goals for Pedagogical
Interactive Narrative
Our goal is to support the creation of interactive narratives for
social interaction training, such as language and culture skill
training, and negotiation training. Central to many social
interactions is the participants’ ability to understand and
predict others’ behaviors, which requires people to have a
Theory of Mind—beliefs about self and others. By giving
characters a capacity forTheory of Mind, we seek to replicate
this key aspect of human social interaction in dynamically
unfolding interactive narratives. We next illustrate Theory of
Mind as the basis for other desiderata of social characters.
2.1. Narrative Coherence and Experience of “Presence”. The
basic goal of interactive narrative is to immerse the user in
a narrative experience in which his or her behavior has an
impact on how the narrative unfolds. The sense of presence,
which is often described as “feeling as if being there” [19–22],
has been shown as an important factor for both providing
entertainment and ensuring the efficacy of virtual training
and the transferring of knowledge and skills to the real world
thereafter [23]. Many factors contribute to the experience of
presence. In order for the user to feel presence in a virtual
environment either with or without a narrative component,
the content of the virtual environment needs to be meaning-
ful [24].Theuser should be able to form amentalmodel of the
virtual world [25–28]. Interactivity and the sense of agency
have been shown to affect the experience of presence [29]. In
particular, the user should know his/her own possible actions
and be able to anticipate the results of his/her actions as well
as other characters/objects’ actions/movements [30]. In other
words, the user must be able to make sense of the experience.
In the context of narrative design, this sense-making
requirement relates to ensuring coherent narrative, which is
defined as “the semiotic representation of a series of events
which are meaningfully connected in a temporal and causal
way” [31]. (Coherent) narrative has been shown as an impor-
tant way for people to organize and make sense of their
experience [32]. In an interactive environment, the story each
user goes through needs to be coherent, and broken narrative
should be prevented from happening during user interaction.
Coherent narrative is particularly important for interactive
narratives designed for pedagogical purposes because we
want the user to understand his/her experience in the way
intended by the designers.
Theory of Mind, we argue, is a powerful generative
approach to creating characters whose behaviors make sense
to a user. Theory of Mind allows the characters to act in well-
motivated ways in dynamic social contexts. Using Theory
of Mind, the characters can form expectations about others’
emotional and physical responses to their potential actions
and then decide what to do based on the expectations. Of
course, characters’ being well-motivated does not mean the
user should always be able to understand the characters’
intentions during the interaction. In fact, a certain level of
unexpectedness or confusion is welcomed both for pedagog-
ical purposes—allowing the user to pause and think deeper
about the characters and the story—and for entertainment
purposes, as we will discuss later. Discrepancies among the
user’s and the characters’ beliefs and expectations are often
the source for creating dramatic effects. The “truth” about
the characters—their motivations, beliefs, and reasoning
processes—can be revealed to the user after the interaction
if needed.
2.2. Affordance for Social Interaction. Secondly, characters
must also support and maintain social interaction with the
user. For this purpose, the characters need to understand
social norms and follow the norms unless they are motivated
to violate them. By doing so, the characters become reliable
and provide an incentive for people to interact with them.
Again, we argue characters’ having Theory of Mind is
important for realizing this function. Norms describe the
general behavioral patterns that are expected to emerge dur-
ing social interaction. Some of the norms can be expressed as
simple reaction rules, such that a person should greet others if
being greeted. Other norms involve understanding another’s
intentions and situations, such as not asking improper ques-
tions. To enable characters to “understand” social norms in
context and make tradeoffs between following norms and
addressing their other high priority goals requires them to
have mental models of others, including other characters’
mental model about themselves. The mental models enable
the characters to understand what is expected from others.
Furthermore, to create the experience of interacting
with an intelligent social character, the characters should
be designed with a “mind” that gives them characteristics
[33–35]. Breazeal studied the requirements to “promote the
illusion of a socially aware robotic creature” and argued that
“to socially engage a human, its behavior must address issues
of believability such as conveying intentionality, promoting
empathy, being expressive, and displaying enough variabil-
ity to appear unscripted while remaining consistent” [33].
Similar arguments have been given for creating digital com-
panions [36] and for assistant robot [37]. It is found that
even when the assistant robot does not need to represent
a social character, having a “personality” helps the user to
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understand and predict its behaviors. Of course, having
Theory of Mind alone does not guarantee the believability
of the characters. However, Theory of Mind provides a
good foundation for representing characters’ intentions and
emotions. Many emotions and, in particular, social emotions
are decided by what the person’s expectations are [38–40].
2.3. Dramatic and Pedagogical Goals. In addition to the basic
goals for creating a believable social interaction environment,
we want to give the designers of interactive narratives some
ability to predict and affect the user’s emotional experience.
The reason for this goal is twofold. First of all, the engaging
power of narrative is often related to the audience’s subjective
emotional experiences. For example, Tan argues that the
central purpose of entertainment films is to evoke emotions
in the viewer and that films are “emotion machines” that
create specific patterns of tension and relaxation over the
course of the experience, arouse interest, and induce the
facsimile of fear, and so forth [41]. Secondly, the goal of some
pedagogical systems is to invoke the user’s emotions or allow
the user to practice his/her decision-making under certain
emotional states. For example, FearNot! is an interactive
narrative game that is aimed at helping children practice how
to deal with a school bully [11] and is aimed at invoking
empathy from the user.
Finally and most critically, we want to be able to encode
pedagogy. In other words, there must be some way for the
learner to interact with the system and learn on the basis
of that interaction. This is of course a very general goal. As
an authoring system for helping authors design interactive
narratives, ideally we want the system to give some feedback
in terms of how such pedagogical goals are related to the
characters’ designs and whether there are potential conflicts
among the characters’ designs, the dramatic goals, and the
pedagogical goals.
For achieving dramatic and pedagogical goals, the system
needs not only modeling characters with a Theory of Mind
but also having aTheory ofMind about the user. Neither dra-
matic nor pedagogical effects can be defined independently
from the user’s beliefs, actions, and experiences.
2.4. Authoring Challenge. Unlike traditional narratives, in
which a fixed line of story is presented to the audience, the
support for interactivity results in a huge, if not unlimited,
number of possible story paths in interactive narratives. Each
of the paths needs to be designed properly—both true to the
individual character’smotivations, beliefs, and circumstances
and reflecting the designer’s dramatic and pedagogical goals.
The complexity of designing these paths increases exponen-
tially as more interactivity is allowed. Moreover, compared
to interactive narratives for games, pedagogical applications
often have more strict requirements for the design of the
interactive experience. The applications are designed for
the users to learn from their interactions with the virtual
characters/world, and the designers by all means do not want
wrong pedagogy to be achieved accidently.
This work is aimed at exploring artificial intelligence
(AI) based approaches to facilitate the creation of interactive
narratives. This work takes a generative, artificial intelligence
(AI) based approach to facilitate the creation of interactive
narratives, whereby stories are represented using an internal
computational model. New stories are generated automati-
cally based on the user’s choices of actions and the current
status of the story. One fundamental issue with using a
generative approach is how to represent information about
the story. The AI techniques which the computational model
can be based on range from simple and explicit ones, such
as rule-based systems, finite state machine, and decision tree,
to more sophisticated ones such as hierarchical task network,
planner, MDP, and POMDP.These techniques provide differ-
entmodeling power and allowdifferent types of character and
narrativemodels to be built on top of them.The disadvantage
of relying on simple and explicit modeling techniques such
as rule-based systems is clear. Such models, though easy to
startworkingwith, do not scale up easily and therefore cannot
represent rich character behaviors in a dynamic environment.
Systems using more sophisticated computational approaches
have advantages in dealing with user interactivity because
they provide an abstract model of the interactive story or
the characters’ internal states which drives the characters’
behaviors. Theory of Mind has been encoded in many
systems for character/story generation and demonstrates its
importance. In the next section, we will review related work
that incorporates Theory of Mind in intelligent agents.
3. Related Work
A body of research has been conducted on human-avatar
interaction, virtual reality, narrative, game, and serious game.
Modeling Theory of Mind in characters can be traced back
to as early as Meehan’s Tale-Spin system which was created
in 1976 [42]. In Tale-Spin, the story unfolds as the characters
look for ways to satisfy their goals using themental models of
each other and the world.
In more recent works, the use of Theory of Mind has
been explored for realizing various aspects of character and
narrative creation. For example, Peters shows that, to initiate
conversations at the appropriate moment, it is important to
formTheory of Mind about others based on their nonverbal
behaviors [43]. Hodhod et al. argue that shared mental mod-
els are important for successful improvisational agents [44].
O’Neill and Riedl model of narrative suspense is built upon
the user’s mental model of the characters and the story [45].
Emotion plays an important role in social interaction.
In modeling emotions for social characters, the appraisal
theories of emotion [38–40, 46] are often used. The appraisal
theories view emotions as the results of one’s evaluation of the
person-environment relationship along several dimensions,
such as how good/bad the current situation is, who caused
the situation, and whether the situation is changeable. In
simulating appraisals,Theory of Mind is often created for the
agents. For example, Aylett and Louchart’s work on double
appraisal enables characters to “understand” others’ feelings
by simulating other agents’ conditions [47]. Belkaid and
Sabouret create a logic based model of Theory of Mind for
emotion [48]. Within Thespian, Si et al. model appraisal
theories in decision-theoretic goal-based agents with Theory
of Mind [49].
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Agents with Theory of Mind capacity have often been
evaluated as being more realistic or more intelligent. Dias et
al. compare agents with two-level Theory of Mind; that is,
agents have a model of my beliefs about your beliefs about
me to agents with a single levelTheory ofMind; that is, agents
only have beliefs about others and find the first type of agents
is perceived as being more socially intelligent [50]. Laird’s
work shows that having a Theory of Mind about the user
can improve AI bot’s performance against human players in
Quake II [51]. Harbers et al. argue that agents for training
systems should have a Theory of Mind about the user [52].
Doirado and Martinho demonstrate that being able to detect
the user’s intentionmakes an agent’s behaviormore believable
[53].
As we have discussed in Section 2, characters havingThe-
ory of Mind addresses key, desired properties of interactive
narratives, including narrative coherence and characters fol-
lowing social norms. In interactive narrative systems where
Theory of Mind is not explicitly modeled, the characters’
behaviors often still suggest theirTheory ofMind. Such effects
are defined conjointly with the characters’ other behaviors.
For example, in Fac¸ade [54], characters’ beliefs are implicitly
encoded in the design of the beats and the beat selection
process.
We argue that an agent architect with built-in support
for Theory of Mind is more preferred for our purpose. Such
modeling makes the characters’ behaviors computationally
interpretable, which means the system can automatically
generate interpretations for the characters’ behaviors in the
context of its environment, motivations, and beliefs. For sim-
ulations that are aimed at training the users’ ability of picking
up social cues or the users’ social interaction skills, it is
important to help the users understand their experiences. It is
through this procedure that the users learn about social rules
and what they have interpreted or have done incorrectly in
the previous sessions. To support this function, the interactive
narrative systemmust provide a way to automatically retrieve
information about the characters’ intentions and beliefs
behind their behaviors. Otherwise, the designers will have
to manually supply such information, which will become a
significant undertaking. In this regard, we argue that any
system that is not able to represent characters’ motivations,
Theory ofMind, and the link between their internal reasoning
processes and behaviors is less preferred for creating rich
characters for social skill training.
In the next section, we present an example of a compu-
tational framework that implements the desired properties
discussed in Section 2. In this system, Theory of Mind is
not just used for modeling some aspects of the characters.
Instead, it is the core for the characters’ decision-making,
norm reasoning, and emotional processes. The name of the
framework is Thespian.
4. Thespian Framework for
Interactive Narratives
Thespian is a multiagent framework we developed for
authoring and simulating interactive narratives [10, 49, 55–
59]. Thespian’s approach seeks to ensure the coherence of
narrative and supports both creating rich characters and
managing the development of the story during the interaction
for realizing the author’s dramatic or pedagogical goals.
Thespian models characters’ motivations as the goals of
decision-theoretic agents. Characters also have models of
other characters and their behaviors are mediated by how
they expect others to respond. In addition, the virtual char-
acters’ behaviors are subject to social norms—the characters
have motivations for obeying social norms. These features
ensure there is an interpretation of social interactions that
happen among the characters, including the user.
Thespian is built based on PsychSim [60, 61], a multiagent
framework for social simulation. In PsychSim, each agent
is modeled based on partially observable Markov decision
problems (POMDPs) [62] and incorporates algorithms for
belief update and decision-making.
4.1. Example Authoring Scenarios. Thespian has been applied
to author dozens of virtual characters in various interac-
tive narratives. The first interactive narrative to incorporate
Thespian is the mission practice environment of the tactical
language training system (TLTS) [63], which is aimed at
providing rapid language and culture training. Thespian has
also been used to model fables such as Little Red Riding
Hood and the Fisherman and His Wife. We describe below
two previous example domains of Thespian to illustrate the
important role Theory of Mind plays in social interaction.
4.1.1. Tactical Language Training System (TLTS). The tactical
language training system is a large-scale (six to twelve
scenes each for three languages) project funded by the US
military for rapid language and culture training. Thespian
was used together with Unreal 2003 to author and simulate
the interactive narratives for the system’s mission practice
environment. The system has been used by thousands of
military personnel and shown to be effective [64].
The user takes the role of a male army sergeant (Sergeant
Smith) who is assigned to conduct a civil affairs mission in a
foreign (e.g., Pashto, Iraqi) town. The human user navigates
in the virtual world using mouse and keyboard. The user can
interact with the virtual characters using spoken language
and gestures. An automated speech recognizer identifies the
utterance and the mission manager, which is a component
outside of Thespian, and converts them into a dialogue act
representation that Thespian takes as input. Output from
Thespian consists of similar dialogue acts that instruct virtual
character bodies to speak and behave.
The story in TLTS consists of multiple scenes. A typical
scene contains two or three main characters and up to six
supporting characters. The main characters usually have 10
to 20 different actions including their dialogue acts, and the
supporting characters typically have fewer than 5 actions. An
example scene is provided below.
As shown in Figure 1, the story happens in a village cafe´.
The user’s aim in the scene is to find the senior official in the
town to discuss providing aid to the locals.There are a variety
of actions he can perform, including moving around the
town, greeting people, introducing himself, asking questions,
and using gestures. The user interacts with a range of
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Table 1: Sample Dialogue in Tactical Language Training System.
Speaker Addressee Utterance
User Old man Who is the most important official inthis town?
Young man User Slow down! Who are you?
User Young man We are Americans.
Young man User CIA?
User Young man No, sir, we are from the AmericanArmy, Special Forces.
Figure 1: Tactical language training system.
characters in the scene, most notably an oldman and a young
man. These two locals have different personalities. The old
man is cooperative. The young man worries more about the
safety of the town and may accuse the sergeant of being a
CIA agent if the user does not establish trust. Table 1 shows
an excerpt from this story.
In this example, Theory of Mind plays an important role
in driving the characters’ behaviors.The youngman character
interrupts the user’s and the old man’s conversation and asks
the user a question. By doing so, he violates norms and
appears rude. He decides to do so because, based on his
mental model about the old man, he expects that the old man
will answer the user’s question if he does not do anything,
and this will threaten his sense of safety. From the user’s
perspective, this interruption should be unexpected.The user
is instructed to establish basic trust with the locals before
asking any questions. At this moment, the user should realize
that what he/she has done for establishing trust is not enough
and should try to make it up in later conversations. If the user
does not, the scenewill continue in an unsuccessful direction.
Using Thespian, the characters’ motivations and decision-
making processes can be revealed to the user in the debriefing
phase.
4.1.2. Little Red Riding Hood Story. This story contains four
main characters, Little Red Riding Hood, Granny, the hunter,
and the wolf.The story starts as Little Red RidingHood (Red)
and the wolf meet each other on the outskirt of a forest, while
Red is on her way to Granny’s house. The wolf has a mind to
eat Red, but it dares not because there are some wood-cutters
close by. At this point, they can either have a conversation or
choose to walk away. The wolf will have chance to eat Red
at other locations where nobody is close by. Moreover, if the
wolf hears about Granny fromRed, it can even go and eat her.
Meanwhile, the hunter is searching the woods for the wolf to
kill it. Once the wolf is killed, people who got eaten by it can
escape. In our modeling of the story, the numbers of possible
actions for Red, Granny, the hunter, and the wolf are 14, 2, 4,
and 10, respectively. The role of either Red or the wolf can be
taken by the user.The user can interact with virtual characters
through a text-based interface.
In this story, Theory of Mind again plays an important
role, specifically inmodeling character’s correct and incorrect
beliefs about others that drive how the story unfolds. It is
Red’s misbelief about the wolf which leads the later tragedy
to happen. The wolf, on the other hand, has quite accurate
beliefs about others. This allows it to find the right strategies
to deal with Red, the woodcutter, Granny, and the hunter,
respectively.The pedagogy of the original story is well known.
However, through making an interactive version of the story,
the user can experience different characters’ perspectives.
Tweaking the characters’ initial beliefs can make the story
deliver a different type of lesson.
We now turn our attention to how Thespian enables the
designers to create such virtual characters as shown in the
above examples.
4.2. Two-Layer Runtime System. Egri has strongly argued for
the importance of characters in traditional narratives [65].
His view of narrative—of rich, well-motivated, autonomous
characters that serve as a creative spark to the author but
are nevertheless constrained by the author’s goals for the
plot—serves as inspiration to the approach taken in this
work. Specifically, Thespian utilizes autonomous agents for
well-motivated and socially aware characters and multiagent
coordination to realize story plots.
At the base is a multiagent system comprised of goal-
oriented autonomous agents (Thespian agents) that real-
ize the characters of the story. The agents in this layer
autonomously interact with each other and the character
controlled by the user, thereby generating the story.
The user is also modeled using aThespian agent based on
the role the user is playing. In modeling the user, not only
are the goals of the user’s character considered but also the
goals associatedwith game play (see [55, 57] formore details).
This model allows other agents to form mental models about
the user in the same way they do about other characters
and the director agent to reason about the user’s beliefs and
experience and thus can be thought of as the system’s Theory
of Mind about the user.
Above this layer is a director agent that proactively directs
the characters for realizing the author’s plot design, which can
be seen as group goals for the multiagent system [58, 59].
4.2.1. Thespian Agent. Decision-theoretic, goal-based agents
are used for modeling the characters in the story. Each agent
is composed of its state, actions, dynamics, goals, beliefs, and
policy. Objects, such as a cake or a house, in the story can be
represented as special Thespian agents that have only state.
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This allows characters to reason about the state of an object
in the same way as that of a character.
State. State contains information about an agent’s current
status in the world. An agent’s state is defined by a set of
state features, such as the name and age of the character, and
the relation between that character and other characters, for
example, affinity. Values of state features are represented as
real numbers bounded in the range of [−1, 1].
Actions/Dialogue Acts. Each agent has a set of actions to
choose from during its interaction. Minimally, the definition
of an action includes an actor, the agent who performs
the action, and an action type. For example, the agent that
models the wolf in the Little Red Riding Hood story can
have an action of “wolf-run.”The definition may also include
an object, which is the target of the action, such as “wolf-
greet-Red.” Thespian does not differentiate between physical
actions and dialogue acts.They are represented and reasoned
by the agents in the same way.
Dynamics. Action dynamics define how actions, either initi-
ated by self or others, change the values of the state features.
Some of the definitions are straightforward such as the fact
that being killed brings one’s life value to zero, where others
require sophisticatedmodeling such as conversational norms
and appraisal dimensions for emotions (see [49, 56] for
examples).
Goals. Goals are defined as a combination of goal items
where each item describes the agent’s desire to maximize or
minimize a state feature, such as safety, or to maximize or
minimize the frequency of an event, such as being praised.
The goal items motivate the agent to take corresponding
actions. Which action to take is decided both by the agent’s
current state and beliefs and by the relative importance each
goal itemhas.Thus, the agent can balancemultiple andpoten-
tially competing goals.
For modeling social relations and social support, agents
can have goals about others’ states or actions. For example,
the woodcutter in the Little Red Riding Hood story has the
goal of ensuring Red is alive. He does not have the goal of
killing the wolf. However, if the wolf eats Red in front of him,
he will kill the wolf to bring Red back to life.
Beliefs (Theory of Mind). InThespian, characters are modeled
with a Theory of Mind—recursive beliefs about self and
others including others’ beliefs about self and others, as
shown in Figure 2. An agent’s subjective view (mental model)
of itself or another agent includes every component of that
agent, that is, its state, beliefs, policy, and so forth. The
“Theory of Mind” capacity enables the agents to reason about
others when making their own decisions and thus makes
them “social characters.”
For representing the uncertain nature of social beliefs,
each agent has amental model of self and one ormoremental
models of other agents.The agent’s belief about another agent
is a probability distribution over alternative mental models.
For example, in the Red Riding Hood story, Red’s mental
Figure 2: Theory of Mind.
models about the wolf are one being that the wolf does not
have a goal of eating people and one being otherwise. Initially,
Red may believe that there is a 90% chance that the first
mentalmodel is true and a 10% chance that the secondmental
model is true.This probability distribution will change if Red
sees or hears about the wolf eating people.
In general, upon observation of an event—something
happens in the virtual environment—each agent updates its
beliefs based on the observation and then makes decisions
based on the updated beliefs. In particular, the relative
probability of alternative mental models is adjusted. Each
observation serves as evidence for the plausibility of alterna-
tive mental models, that is, how consistent the observation
is with the predictions from the mental models. Using this
information, the probabilities of the mental models are
updated based on Bayes’ theorem [66].
Decision-Making Process. In Thespian, all agents use a
bounded lookahead policy by default. When an agent has
multiple mental models about other agents, by default, it uses
the most probable mental models to predict other agents’
future actions, though the expected states/utilities of all
alternative mental models are calculated for the purpose of
belief revision.
Each agent has a set of candidate actions to choose from
whenmaking decisions.When an agent selects its next action,
it projects into the future to evaluate the effect of each
option on the states and beliefs of other entities in the story.
The agent considers not only the immediate effect but also
the expected responses of other characters using its mental
models about the characters and, in turn, the effects of those
responses, its reaction to those responses, and so on. The
agent evaluates the overall effect with respect to its goals and
then chooses the action that has the highest expected reward.
Thus, the agents’ actions are driven by their motivations,
taking into account the status of the interaction. For example,
in the “Little Red Riding Hood” story, the wolf will react
to Red differently depending on whether there is somebody
else close by and who that is. The wolf will choose different
actions when the hunter is near or when the woodcutter is
near, because the wolf has different mental models about
these two characters. During the interaction, the agents do
not necessarily need to do the lookahead reasoning online;
rather, they can use compiled policies which are precomputed
offline [67].
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Encoding Social Norms. Unlike most interactive narrative
frameworks, Thespian explicitly models norms in face to
face communication using a domain-independent model
built within a decision-theoretic context. In general, actions
by one agent can impose a type of obligation on another,
and a certain set of responding actions will satisfy the
obligation to some degree.We currently use these obligations
to encode a broad set of social norms as pairs of initiating and
responding actions: greeting and greeting back, introducing
oneself and introducing oneself back, conveying information
and acknowledging, inquiring and informing, thanking and
saying you are welcome, offering and accepting/rejecting,
requesting and accepting/rejecting, and so forth.
Thespian agents have explicit goals to following norms
[56]. By giving the agents goals to satisfy any such outstanding
obligations, we give them an incentive to follow the encoded
social norms while also considering tradeoffs between sat-
isfying different goals. Thus, the agents can reason about
their decision-making and norm-following behaviors using
a unified framework. The relative priorities among all of
these goals reflect the value that the character places on the
corresponding social norms. For example, using Thespian,
the author can model two agents—one regards following
norms as an important goal and one does not. When the
agents are in a hurry, they will behave in the same way—
both ignore norm-related goals. However, they will behave
differently under a different context.
4.2.2. Directorial Control. Thedirector agent guides the char-
acters’ interactions with the user, based on the author’s direc-
torial control goals which are expressed as partial order or
temporal constraints on the characters’ and user’s beliefs and
actions, such as “the wolf should not be found by the hunter
until it finds out where Granny is” and “Red should be eaten
by the wolf within 10 steps after Granny has been eaten.”
During the interaction, the director agent proactively
estimates the future developments of the story and fine-
tunes the characters if necessary to achieve the goals. The
director agent has access to models of the agents and the
user. It uses these models to assess whether plot goals will
be achieved as well as redirect the characters when needed.
For redirecting the characters, the director agent takes the
least commitment approach. It maintains a space of character
configurations, that is, their goals and beliefs consistent with
the characters’ prior behavior. All of these configurations are
equally valid in the sense that they will drive the character to
act in the same way up to the current point of the interaction.
When the director agent foresees a violation of the author’s
plot design goals, it constrains that space so that the rest of
the configurations will drive the agent to act in a way that
eliminates the violation (see [58] for more details). Thus,
from the user’s perspective, the characters are always well
motivated, and the user can interact freely with them.
4.3. Embed Pedagogical Goals. Thespian supports three
approaches to encode learning goals into interactive narra-
tives.
First, learning goals can be embedded in the world’s
dynamics and the characters’ goals. For example, one of the
pedagogical goals in the tactical language project is for the
learner to learn to establish a relationship with the local
people, in particular a relationship of trust. We can encode
this pedagogical goal into the action dynamics by ensuring
that failure to establish trust will have consequences. At its
most severe, distrust can cause irreparable breakdowns in
social interactions. Specifically, in this scene if a learner fails
to achieve even the minimal requirement for this trust goal,
the young man will accuse him of being a CIA agent, and all
characters will refuse to talk to him.
Secondly, Thespian can provide characters with the
explicit intention that the learner learns. In this approach to
encoding the pedagogy, characters have a goal that the learner
acquires skills specified by the pedagogy. In other words, the
characters could have the intention that the learner learns (or
does not learn for that matter). A character could then use its
mental model of the learner as a user model to measure the
degree to which the pedagogical goals are achieved.
The Theory of Mind embedded within Thespian forms
a subjective view of the world that includes beliefs about
the learner’s knowledge and capabilities. A character, for
example, could have the explicit goal that the learner practices
gaining trust. Having encoded such a goal, the character
could now evaluate a possible action choice using its mental
model of the learner’s goals to assess the effect on the learner
and, in turn, on the pedagogical goals so encoded. Note that
this is different from setting the character to trust the learner
at the beginning. This goal setting will drive the character
to deliberately behave in a fashion that would elicit behavior
from the learner that increases trust. Although it is not an
explicit intention of the character, its behavior does assist the
learner. Again, because we have priorities regarding the goals,
we can choose how much a particular character is driven by
pedagogical goals for the learner in relation to its personal
goals.
Finally, a third way to encode the pedagogy is through
the director agent. By setting up directorial control goals, we
can explicitly encode the intention to teach in the overall
system. When the directorial goals cannot be reached with-
out violating the constraint of characters having consistent
motivations,Thespian will give up the directorial goals unless
the author has indicated otherwise, so that the characters’
behaviors are interpretable to the user, and the user is more
likely to have a coherent narrative experience.
These three approaches to encode pedagogy—in the
world’s dynamics, in the character’s intentions, and in the
system’s intention—provide Thespian with a rich framework
for realizing pedagogical interactive narratives.
5. Discussion
We have presented Thespian’s agent architect and illustrated
in the above examples how Thespian can be used to model
two different types of stories and the characters in them.
A question that arises naturally is as follows. Can Thespian
model other types of stories and characters?
As a modeling tool, Thespian does not capture accurately
all human social and psychological phenomena. For example,
do people always explicitly perform forward reasoning for
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making a decision? Even when they do, do they perform
reasoning at the same level of detail as Thespian agents?
How does a person’s current emotional state affect his/her
decision-making process and even their memories of past
events? In futurework,we plan to address someof these issues
by extending Thespian’s models of human decision-making,
opinion-forming, and emotional processes.
On the other hand, even at its current stage, Thespian is
a sophisticated and useful tool for modeling and simulating
characters for social interaction and culture skills training
purposes. The most important goal for such training appli-
cations is to help the users understand social interaction
and, further, practice their social interaction skills in context.
The users may lack the ability to pick up social cues, to
think about the outcomes of their actions thoroughly, or to
switch roles and think from another person’s perspective.
Thespian agents are designed to make the reasoning process
transparent and also explicitly incorporate Theory of Mind
in reasoning. Thus, the users can learn from the agents how
to make social decisions in their own social lives. Moreover,
the system can reveal the agents’ motivations and reasoning
processes behind their actions and thus help the user practice
picking up cues in social interactions and interpreting others’
intentions. Of course, by simply providing such capacity,
Thespian cannot ensure the user learns. In this regard,
Thespian is incomplete as a standalone tutoring system. The
design and evaluation of the pedagogical goals both rely on
the designer of the interactive narrative. Nevertheless, we
believe Thespian provides a good foundation for supporting
the designers.
6. Future Work
Future work has been planned to extend existing Thespian
models of decision-making and emotion. Currently, charac-
ters are modeled as goal-based agents and use a deliberate
lookahead reasoning process to decide their actions. This is
not the only way people make decisions. People also make
decisions through shallower process, such as retrieval of sim-
ilar past experience, using only the most salient information
for reasoning.
Similarly,Thespian’s currentmodel of emotion is based on
the appraisal theory, which defines emotion as the character’s
evaluation of its person-environment relationship. However,
other factors also affect people’s emotions, such as their prior
emotional state, memory of past experiences, and even the
emotions of other people around them. In later versions of
Thespian, wewant to establish a unified computationalmodel
for emotion that considers more of these factors.
Finally, Thespian so far has only been used for creat-
ing digital avatars which are displayed on either computer
monitors or projector screens. Computing technologies, in
particular Internet technologies and mobile computing tech-
nologies, have advanced rapidly over the past decade. There
has been an increased interest in developing personal assis-
tance robots, combining an intelligent agent with a moveable
platform. These new platforms present unique challenges as
well as an opportunity for an intelligent conversational agent
and interactive narrative. For example, the agent may have
access to the user’s physical location, and this can influence
how it interacts with the user. We are interested in extending
Thespian to work on these new platforms.
7. Conclusion
Computer aided pedagogical interactive narrative represents
a new interdisciplinary research and application field. In
this paper, we analyzed the design challenges faced by the
designers of pedagogical interactive narratives for social
interaction training and identified the key requirements for
characters in these interactive narratives as well as for the
authoring framework for creating such characters. We argue
that a rich model of characters withTheory of Mind capacity
is needed, and, for pedagogical purposes, it is preferred that
the characters’ motivations and beliefs behind their behaviors
can be explained to the user after the interaction. The
Thespian framework for interactive narratives is presented,
together with examples of applying it to model characters
withTheory of Mind.
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